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TAKING STOCK OF THE BENEFIT
CORPORATION
By: Ronald J. Colombo*

ABSTRACT
Almost a decade ago, the “benefit corporation” first appeared on American
soil. Its supporters proclaimed that this would usher in a new era of corporate
social responsibility. Its detractors complained that the benefit corporation
would facilitate managerial abuses that corporate law had worked so hard to
curb. After nearly ten years of experience with the benefit corporation, who
was the more accurate prognosticator? Moreover, has the benefit corporation
given rise to developments, whether beneficial or negative, that were not expected or foreseen?
This Article traces the history of the benefit corporation, with a focus on the
promise that its early supporters identified with it. It also examines the criticisms that this new form of business organization provoked. The Article concludes that, contrary to the predictions of both camps, the benefit corporation
has not, apparently, resulted in much change at all.
In its final Section, the Article explores the reasons why the benefit corporation has had, thus far at least, such minimal impact on the course of American
business and corporate law. The conclusion reached is that, for good or for ill,
benefit corporation statutes do not materially change the rules of corporate
governance. Rather, they simply explicitly permit benefit corporations to conduct themselves according to standards of conduct that traditional corporate
law statutes already implicitly permit. Although the promoters of benefit corporation legislation have argued that even this minor change would have an
impact on businesses by effecting a normative shift in corporate decision-making, contemporary market forces appear to have had the same result on a far
broader scale.
Lastly, this Article considers some of the unexpected repercussions of the
benefit corporation, whether manifested or growing in potential.
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I. INTRODUCTION
An interesting and rather recent development in American corporate law has been that of the “public benefit corporation,” otherwise
known as simply the “benefit corporation.” First appearing in Maryland in 2010,1 the benefit corporation builds upon previous attempts
to explicitly marry the for-profit business corporation to objectives
1. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 594 (2011).
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that are not wholly profit-oriented. Many well-known companies—
Kickstarter, Patagonia,2 and multi-billion-dollar DanoneWave (parent
of brands including Activia, Dannon, and Horizon Organic)3—have
opted to organize as benefit corporations.
The benefit corporation phenomenon was greeted with both cheers
and jeers. Advocates of the benefit corporation heralded its advent as
the dawn of a new age of corporate social responsibility. Naysayers
derided the benefit corporation as an unnecessary and, moreover,
dangerous development that threatened corporate law’s carefully constructed shareholder protections.
With the hindsight of almost a decade of experience with the benefit
corporation, what preliminary conclusions can be drawn? Which set of
prognosticators is history proving correct? This Article seeks to answer these questions.
Part II of this Article will set forth a brief history of the benefit
corporation and thereafter carefully examine the state statutes authorizing benefit corporations (in addition to the Model Legislation proffered by B Lab). As of this writing, thirty-six states have adopted
some form of benefit corporation legislation, and another five are in
the process of doing so.4
Part III will summarize the various comments, both positive and
negative, that accompanied the introduction of the benefit corporation to the panoply of American forms of business organization. Accompanying this summary, I will provide a critical assessment of the
various comments and predictions.
Part IV will consider the potential reasons behind the accuracy (or
inaccuracy) of the various predictions concerning the benefit corporation. Part IV will also explore unanticipated developments regarding
the benefit corporation.
The Article concludes that benefit corporation statutes have not
had their anticipated effects, neither positive nor negative, because
traditional corporate law, prevailing corporate norms, and contemporary market pressures combine to efface the changes putatively
brought about by benefit corporation legislation.

2. See What is a Benefit of a Corporation?, BENEFIT CORP., www.benefitcorp.net
(last visited May 29, 2019) [https://perma.cc/4VXN-EX9P].
3. See Ryan Deffenbaugh, DanoneWave Launches as Country’s Largest PublicBenefit Corporation, WESTFAIR COMMS. (Apr. 26, 2017), http://westfaironline.com/88
619/danonewave-launches-countrys-largest-public-benefitcorporation [https://perma
.cc/T652-S6BK].
4. See State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/
policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) [https://perma.cc/5Q7SC6MY].
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II. BENEFIT CORPORATION LEGISLATION
A. Historical Background
Historically, the corporation has seesawed between an entity organized for the common good versus one created for private gain.5 This
has been reflected in the law of corporations, which has undergone a
variety of developments and stages, ranging from concessionary to
natural entity to private property conceptualizations.6 In its current
manifestation, the corporation is generally conceived of as a product
of private ordering—a nexus of contracts—pursuant to which shareholders are afforded certain privileges of ownership status. This reaffirms the concept of shareholder primacy, a dominant feature of
corporate law since at least 1932 when Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner
C. Means published their influential book, The Modern Corporation
and Private Property.7
Nevertheless, support for a more explicitly “common good” orientation of the corporation (as perhaps best exemplified under yesteryear’s concessionary approaches to the corporation) persists,
generating a certain uneasiness over the current conceptualization of
the corporation and the general thrust of corporate law.8 Indeed, from
its earliest days, the concept of shareholder primacy has been challenged, as evidenced by the lively debate between Adolf Berle and
Edwin Dodd throughout the 1930s over for whose benefit the corporation ought to be managed.9
An early, successful encroachment upon shareholder primacy came
in the form of “nonshareholder constituency statutes,” a movement
that began in the 1980s and culminated in in approximately thirty
states passing legislation.10 This legislation explicitly enables corporate
directors to “consider the interests of employees and other groups in
5. See, e.g., Colin Mayer, Reinventing the Corporation, 4 J. OF BRITISH ACAD53, 57–59 (2016). Of course, the insights of Adam Smith demonstrate that the
two are not necessarily mutually exclusive. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS bk IV, Chapter II (Library of Economics and Liberty ed., 2000) (1776), www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN13.html
[https://perma.cc/EVM9-JM94] (“By pursuing his own interest [the individual] frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to
promote it.”).
6. See Ronald J. Colombo, The Corporation as a Tocquevillian Association, 85
TEMPLE L. REV. 1, 6–15 (2012).
7. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
8. See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 975 (2006).
9. See Fenner Stewart Jr., Berle’s Conception of Shareholder Primacy: A Forgotten Perspective for Reconsideration During the Rise of Finance, 34 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 1457, 1474–1491 (2011).
10. See Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and
False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 85 (1999); George A. Mocsary, Freedom of
Corporate Purpose, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1319, 1359 n.212 (2016).
EMY,
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addition to shareholders when making decisions.”11 In light of the business judgment rule12 and the latitude it grants to directorial decisionmaking, many commentators have argued that these statutes were
largely superfluous, offering merely marginal, unnecessary protections.13 Nevertheless, just because a director can do a particular thing
and act without consequence, does not mean he or she should do such
a thing. Thus, an argument could be made that nonshareholder constituency statutes serve an important normative role; even if accomplishing nothing else, these statutes broadcast to corporate directors a
certain freedom to act on behalf of nonshareholder constituents with
not simply technical impunity, but rather with the explicit imprimatur
of corporate law. Given that shareholder primacy is a powerful corporate norm,14 the value of nonshareholder constituency statutes from a
behavioral perspective should not be underestimated. The impact of
such statutes has been undeniably blunted, however, by the fact that
Delaware has not adopted a nonshareholder constituency statute.15
Building upon nonshareholder constituency statutes has been the
phenomenon of “B Corps.”16 Pioneered by B Lab, B Corps are corporations that have obtained private, third-party certification (from B
Lab) of their efforts to consider the impact of corporate decisions
upon various specified nonshareholder constituents.17 Thus, whereby
nonshareholder constituency statutes ostensibly enable corporate directors to veer from the North Star of shareholder primacy, B Lab
certification serves to verify that a particular company has in fact tempered its embrace of shareholder primacy by taking into account the
concerns of other constituents and corporate stakeholders.
In 2010, B Lab leveraged its certification expertise and drafted its
model benefit corporation legislation (the “Model Legislation”) for
states to adopt.18 The Model Legislation provides for the incorporation of a “benefit corporation”: a business enterprise with the hybrid
11. See Springer, supra note 10.
12. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004).
13. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes,
19 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 971, 998–99 (1992).
14. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 280
(1998).
15. Mocsary, supra note 10, at 1359.
16. Reiser, supra note 1. I am not addressing the advent of CIC or L3C organizations in this history, as the former is a European (U.K.) phenomenon, and the latter is
a variation on the limited liability company. See id. at 593–94. As such, neither directly concern the American business corporation.
17. Reiser, supra note 1. For a detailed explanation of the B Corp certification
process, see Ke Cao et al., Standing Out and Fitting In: Charting the Emergence of
Certified B Corporations by Industry and Region, in 19 ADVANCES IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP, FIRM EMERGENCE AND GROWTH 1, 8–9 (2017).
18. Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 381, 383
(2017).
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objective of combining profitmaking with a “general public benefit.”19
Not surprisingly, the Model Legislation’s provisions closely mirror
those required to obtain B Lab certification.20 Later that same year, B
Lab successfully lobbied Maryland to become the first state to pass
benefit corporation legislation.21 Whereas a B Corp voluntarily
pledges to take into account the interests of nonshareholder constituencies in its decision-making (at the risk of losing its certification), a
benefit corporation is statutorily bound to do so.22 This offers companies the prospect of “government-backed legitimacy,” enabling them
to better distinguish themselves from the cacophony of twenty-firstcentury corporate voices touting their socially-responsible behavior.23
B. The Model Legislation
The Model Legislation promulgated by B Lab has been extremely
influential, forming the basis of the vast majority of state benefit corporation laws.24 Indeed, over thirty jurisdictions have passed benefit
corporation statutes, but only Delaware and Colorado have taken an
approach that differs significantly from the Model Legislation’s approach.25 This is unsurprising, given that B Lab drafted the Model
Legislation before any state had experimented with benefit corporations, and has aggressively lobbied for the adoption of the Model Legislation.26 Unfortunately, the Model Legislation did not profit from
the vetting process employed by most other forms of model legislation, such as those proffered by the American Law Institute, leading
to a number of alleged deficiencies that have been replicated in most
of the adopting states.27
In the sections immediately to follow, the pertinent text of the
Model Legislation will be set forth, quoted where necessary and summarized where not. In so doing, I shall not strictly follow the layout of
the Model Legislation but will, at times, consider certain sections together where helpful for purposes of analysis. Thereafter, the benefit
corporation legislation adopted by Delaware will be set forth and examined. Particular deviations taken by other states will also be
recognized.
19. Felicia R. Resor, Benefit Corporation Legislation, 12 WYO. L. REV. 91, 101
(2012).
20. Id. at 102.
21. Michael B. Dorff, Why Public Benefit Corporations?, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77,
82 (2017).
22. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301(a) (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017),
https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%
20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XN6-P459].
23. Lide E. Paterno, Irresponsible Corporate-Responsibility, 77 U. PITT. L. REV.
499, 520 (2016).
24. Loewenstein, supra note 18, at 381–82.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 383.
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1. Continued General Applicability of State Corporate Law
Section 101 of the Model Legislation, along with the accompanying
commentary, makes it abundantly clear that “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided” by the Model Legislation, the enacting state’s business corporation law “shall generally apply to all benefit corporations.”28 This
underscores the hybrid nature of the benefit corporation as an entity
that takes the form and adopts the general principles of the traditional
business corporation, with a handful of adjustments aimed at better
enabling the entity to operate “with a corporate purpose broader than
maximizing shareholder value” and to “consciously undertake[ ] a responsibility to maximize the benefits of its operations for all stakeholders, not just shareholders.”29
2. Electing Benefit Corporation Status
A newly formed corporation can incorporate as a benefit corporation by simply stating in its articles of incorporation that it is a benefit
corporation.30
With regard to existing business corporations, a two-thirds vote of
“every class or series” of stock is required for the entity to adopt benefit corporation status.31 More specifically, the vote shall authorize the
amendment of the entity’s articles of incorporation to add to its existing language “a statement that the corporation is a benefit corporation.”32 This two-thirds threshold for every class or series of stock
applies “regardless of a limitation stated in the article of incorporation
or bylaws on the voting rights of any class or series.”33
The Model Legislation also addresses the prospect of a benefit corporation merging (or undergoing a consolidation, conversion, or share
exchange) with a non-benefit corporation. In such situations, if the
resulting or surviving entity is to be a benefit corporation, the shareholders of the non-benefit corporation must approve the transaction
by a two-thirds vote of every class or series of stock.34 This vote is not
on the benefit corporation status of the resulting or surviving entity
per se, but rather on the merger itself. Thus, in situations where a twothirds vote for such a fundamental change is already required, the
Model Legislation adds nothing to the process other than requiring
that “every class or series” of shareholder approve the transaction (including those classes and series of shares that would not have ordina28. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 101 (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017).
29. Id. § 101 cmt.
30. Id. § 103.
31. See id. § 104(a) (requiring “minimum status vote” to adopt benefit corporation
status); Id. § 102 (defining “minimum status vote” as two-thirds of “every class or
series” of stock).
32. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 104(a) (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017).
33. Id. § 102.
34. Id. § 104(b)(1).
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rily been entitled to vote upon the transaction). In the event that the
supermajorities required for the merger is less than two-thirds, or in
the event that certain classes or series of shares are not entitled to
vote upon the merger, the merger may be approved under state corporate law, but the requirements of the benefit corporation statutes
will not be fulfilled. Presumably, in this case, the transaction would go
through as approved, but the resulting or surviving entity would not
be a benefit corporation.
The Model Legislation dispenses with the aforementioned fundamental-transactions vote requirement in the case of a corporation
where the shareholders may not vote on the merger under state law,
pursuant to a typical “short form” merger statute.35
Entities that avail themselves of the Model Legislation are called
“benefit corporations,”36 a non-copyrighted term that B Lab nevertheless jealously guards.37
Finally, it should be noted that the Model Legislation limits benefit
corporation status to domestic companies.38
3. Terminating Benefit Corporation Status
Under the Model Legislation, a two-thirds vote of “every class or
series” of stock is required for a business entity to terminate its benefit corporation status.39 More specifically, the vote shall authorize the
amendment of the entity’s articles of incorporation to delete therefrom language identifying the entity as a benefit corporation.”40 This
two-thirds threshold for every class or series of stock applies “regardless of a limitation stated in the articles of incorporation or bylaws on
the voting rights of any class or series.”41
If a merger (or consolidation, conversion, or share exchange)
“would have the effect of terminating the status of a business corporation as a benefit corporation,” two-thirds of every class or series of
stock of the benefit corporation must approve the transaction.42 Similar to the election of benefit corporation status, this vote is not, apparently, on the termination of the benefit corporation status but rather
on the merger itself.43 Thus, in the event that the supermajorities re35. Id. § 104(b)(2).
36. Id. § 101(a).
37. Loewenstein, supra note 18, at 382. Indeed, B Lab has reportedly threatened
to actively oppose any legislation employing the “benefit corporation” nomenclature
that does not meet their approval. Id. at 382 n.7.
38. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 103 cmt. (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017).
39. See id. § 105(a) (requiring “minimum status vote” to terminate benefit corporation status); Id. § 102 (defining “minimum status vote” as two-thirds of “every class
or series” of stock).
40. Id. § 105(a).
41. Id. § 102.
42. Id. § 105(b)(1).
43. See id. § 104(b)(1)–(2).
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quired for the merger is less than two-thirds or in the event that certain classes or series of shares are not entitled to vote upon the
merger, the possibility arises that the merger will be approved under
state corporate law, but that the requirements for terminating benefit
corporation status will not be fulfilled. Presumably, in this case, the
transaction would go through as approved, but the resulting or surviving entity would retain its status as a benefit corporation.
Also, as with the election of benefit corporation status, the Model
Legislation dispenses with the fundamental-transactions vote requirement in the case of a corporation where the shareholders are not entitled to vote on the merger under state law, pursuant to a typical “short
form” merger statute.44
Finally, in a provision that does supplant the ordinary operation of
state corporate law, the Model Legislation declares that:
Any sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of all or substantially
all of the assets of a benefit corporation, unless the transaction is in
the usual and regular course of business, shall not be effective unless the transaction is approved by at least the minimum status
vote.45

This provision prevents circumvention of the rules requiring a twothirds vote to undertake a transaction that would strip an entity of its
benefit corporation status.46
4. Corporate Purposes and Public Benefit
The substantive meaning of the term “benefit corporation” is not
provided in the Model Legislation’s definitions section. Rather, what
it means to be a benefit corporation is encompassed by the Model
Legislation as a whole, particularly section 201, “Corporate
Purposes.”
Per section 201, a benefit corporation “shall have a purpose of creating general public benefit.”47 Optionally adjoined to this mandatory
purpose may be “one or more specific public benefits.”48 Such optional “specific public benefits” shall not “limit the purpose of the
benefit corporation to create general public benefit.”49 Consequently,
critical to an understanding of section 201 and the benefit corporation
itself is an understanding of what constitutes a “general public benefit” and a “specific public benefit.” These are defined terms in the
Model Legislation.
“General public benefit” is defined, in its entirety, as:
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 105(b)(2) (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017).
Id. § 105(c).
Id. § 105 cmt.
Id. § 201(a).
Id. § 201(b).
Id.
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A material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as
a whole, from the business and operations of a benefit corporation
assessed considering the impacts of the benefit corporation as reported against a third-party standard.50

This definition immediately invites a number of criticisms. First,
there is the curious conjunctive coupling of “society” with “the environment”—a coupling that persists throughout the Model Legislation’s commentary and subsequent sections.51 There is a panoply of
needs and concerns that huge majorities of U.S. citizens would most
likely recognize as critically important to the public, many of which
rank higher than “the environment.” According to the Pew Research
Center, Americans’ top priorities for 2018 consisted of (in order): terrorism, education, the economy, healthcare costs, social security, and
Medicare.52 Only next comes the environment, tied with jobs.53
Among the top priorities—and others—the Model Legislation singles
out the environment for specific attention. Fortunately, the Model
Legislation quickly adds the qualifier “taken as a whole,” clarifying
that good works such as providing food, shelter, and clothing to the
poor (to take one handful of examples) could still possibly be counted
as providing a “general public benefit,” notwithstanding their lack of
any obvious positive impact upon the environment per se. Indeed, the
“taken as a whole” qualifier is critically important because many efforts to serve society might actually have a deleterious effect upon the
environment, and the Model Legislation appears to sanction such an
effect so long as it offsets some even greater, positive social effect.54
The next curious aspect of the definition of “general public benefit”
is that it fails to recognize the fact that a large number of successful,
traditional business corporations create “general public benefits” simply by virtue of their success: employing men and women, distributing
wages, providing and subsidizing medical benefits, growing retirement
and other investment savings, and generating tax revenues. There is a
reason why so many states and localities compete to land corporate
relocations within their territories, and why Columbia University
President Nicholas Murray Butler famously declared, “[I]n my judgment the limited liability corporation is the greatest single discovery
of modern times . . . Even steam and electricity are far less important
50. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102 (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017).
51. Id. § 102 cmt.
52. Valerie Strauss, New Poll of Americans’ Top Priorities for 2018 Has Education
at No. 2 – Ahead of the Economy, WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2018/01/25/new-poll-of-americans-top-pri
orities-for-2018-has-education-at-no-2-ahead-of-the-economy/?utm_term=.a7aeb4e34
95f [https://perma.cc/DH8S-BSYH].
53. Id.
54. But see Joseph W. Yockey, Does Social Enterprise Law Matter?, 66 ALA. L.
REV. 767, 795 (2015) (“[t]he statutory language implies that benefit corporations must
adhere to a triple rather than double bottom line”).
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than the limited liability corporation, and they would be reduced to
comparative impotence without it.”55 Thus, while one need not agree
with Milton Friedman that The Social Responsibility of Business is to
Increase Its Profits,56 it is not too much to ask that the Model Legislation articulate why the aforementioned benefits do not constitute a
“material positive impact on society”—or, even in the face of some
offsetting environmental harm, “a material positive impact on society
and the environment, taken as a whole.”
As such, the Model Legislation’s use of the terms “benefit corporation” and “general public benefit” are not as neutral as they may appear: they reflect a particular understanding of what constitutes a
public benefit and appear to discount the tremendous public benefits
that typical, traditional business corporations, both individually and in
the aggregate, regularly bestow upon society.57 Indeed, in some states,
benefit corporation legislation was defeated on precisely these
grounds: that the advent of the benefit corporation creates “a false
dichotomy between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ business.”58
This is not to suggest that there is no difference between the general
social benefits of a free market system brought about via the pursuit
of self-interest under the corporate form, on the one hand, and the
more intentionally beneficent,59 quasi-altruistic work of those companies identifying as benefit corporations on the other. Nor is it suggested that the free market system is without its flaws, including those
stemming from the very same aforementioned pursuit of self-interest.
It is nevertheless fair to criticize the Model Legislation for failing to
identify and articulate such difference satisfactorily.
As indicated, the Model Legislation also provides a definition of
“specific public benefit.” A “specific public benefit” includes:
(1) providing low-income or underserved individuals or communities with beneficial products or services;
(2) promoting economic opportunity for individuals or communities beyond the creation of jobs in the normal course of business;
(3) protecting or restoring the environment;
(4) improving human health;
(5) promoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge;
(6) increasing the flow of capital to entities with a purpose to benefit society or the environment; and
55. NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER, 143D ANNUAL BANQUET OF THE CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 48 (1911).
56. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32.
57. See BUTLER, supra note 55; cf. Ezra Rosser, Poverty Offsetting, 6 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 179, 180 (2012).
58. Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out:
Who’s Opting In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 247, 249 (2014).
59. Cf. Alina S. Ball, Social Enterprise Governance, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 919, 921
(2016) (“Social enterprises are business ventures that intentionally affect societal
good.”) (emphasis added).
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(7) conferring any other particular benefit on society or the
environment.60

This too is a curious provision. Recall that these enumerated particular benefits, if adopted, are deemed to be “in addition to” the purpose of “creating general public benefit.”61 Traditional canons of
statutory construction would suggest, quite strongly, that these particular benefits do not of themselves create a general public benefit. It is
difficult to see how that is so. Indeed, even benefits specifically relating to the environment are identified in this definition (three times),
yet endeavoring to have a materially positive impact upon the environment was previously identified as an element of “general public
benefit.” As such, the two definitional sections, “general public benefit” and “specific public benefit,” do not appear congruent.
Further, the existence of a catch-all provision (“(7) conferring any
other particular benefit on society or the environment”) essentially
renders items (1) through (6) unnecessary. It is, of course, not uncommon for legislation to list a variety of particulars and end with a more
general, open-ended provision. However, this is usually done when
the specifically-enumerated items serve some important purpose, such
as establishing safe harbors or certain unquestionably sanctioned
choices. Here, items (1) through (6) appear to do no such thing. They
seem to be set forth primarily, if not solely, to serve some normative
purpose—to promote those causes that the Model Legislation’s drafters deemed most worthy.
It would seem as though the Model Legislation could have been
improved by dispensing with the odd dichotomy of “general public
benefit” versus “specific public benefit,” and by simply adopting the
general language of the catch-all provision set forth above. In other
words, the substantive core of the benefit corporation could have been
simply defined as “a corporation having as one of its purposes the
conferral of a particular benefit on society.” Finally, the references to
the environment are superfluous, given that environmental preservation and/or restoration is itself commonly understood as beneficial to
society as a whole.
5. Accountability: Standard of Conduct for Directors
Subchapter 3 of the Model Legislation addresses accountability.
The concept of accountability is introduced in the very definition of
“general public benefit,” which includes an important reference to “a
third-party standard”62 (a matter to which we shall return63). Subchapter 4, entitled “Transparency,” arguably continues this focus on
60.
61.
62.
63.

MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102 (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017).
Id. § 201(a)–(b).
Id. § 102.
See infra text accompanying notes 94–95.
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accountability. As such, half of the Model Legislation’s four subchapters is devoted to the concept of benefit corporation accountability.
Section 301 initiates the focus on accountability by setting forth the
standard of conduct for directors in a benefit corporation. Part (a) of
section 301 articulates the interests that a director must consider in
fulfilling his or her responsibilities to the benefit corporation. This important part merits recitation in full:
(a) Consideration of interests. In discharging the duties of their respective positions and in considering the best interests of the benefit
corporation, the board of directors, committees of the board, and
individual directors of a benefit corporation:
(1) shall consider the effects of any action or inaction upon:
(i) the shareholders of the benefit corporation;
(ii) the employees and workforce of the benefit corporation, its subsidiaries, and its suppliers;
(iii) the interests of customers as beneficiaries of the general public benefit or a specific public benefit purpose of
the benefit corporation;
(iv) community and societal factors, including those of each
community in which offices or facilities of the benefit corporation, its subsidiaries, or its suppliers are located;
(v) the local and global environment;
(vi) the short-term and long-term interests of the benefit
corporation, including benefits that may accrue to the benefit corporation from its long-term plans and the possibility
that these interests may be best served by the continued independence of the benefit corporation; and
(vii) the ability of the benefit corporation to accomplish its
general public benefit purpose and any specific public benefit purpose; and
(2) may consider:
[(i) the interests referred to in [cite constituencies provision
of the business corporation law if it refers to constituencies
not listed above]; and
(ii)] other pertinent factors or the interests of any other
group that they deem appropriate; but
(3) need not give priority to a particular interest or factor referred to in paragraph (1) or (2) over any other interest or factor unless the benefit corporation has stated in its articles of
incorporation its intention to give priority to certain interests or
factors related to the accomplishment of its general public benefit purpose or of a specific public benefit purpose identified in
its articles.64

Part (a) is divided into three subparts: the first addressing those interests that a benefit corporation director must (“shall”) consider, the
second addressing those that the director may (optionally) consider,
64. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301(a) (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017) (italics
in original).
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and the third addressing the question of prioritization. Let us review
these subparts in turn.
Subpart (1) identifies those interests that a benefit corporation director must consider in discharging his or her duties. The interested
parties include the various constituencies of the corporation, starting
with the shareholders and proceeding through the corporation’s employees, customers, and communities in which the company (or its
subsidiaries or suppliers) is located. This is a fairly typical list of stakeholders and mirrors the lists provided in nonshareholder constituency
statutes referenced previously.65 Added to this list is the local and
global environment, the short-term and long-term interests of the benefit corporation itself, and finally, “the ability of the benefit corporation to accomplish its general public purpose and any specific public
benefit purpose.”66
According to the Model Legislation’s official commentary, this section “is at the heart of what it means to be a benefit corporation” and
amounts to a “rejection” of those authorities that require a corporation to “maximize the financial value of a corporation.”67 As the comment correctly points out, although the list of stakeholders is indeed
similar to that found in most nonshareholder constituency statutes,
these statutes typically merely authorize directors to consider such interests—the Model Legislation requires such interests to be
considered.68
Section 301(a) helps elucidate what the Model Legislation means
when it refers to a “general public benefit.”69 By supplying this list of
mandatory interests that benefit corporation directors “shall consider,” the Model Legislation, consequently, provides us with the substantive content of “general public benefit.” In other words, a
“general public benefit” is something that has a net positive effect
upon this universe of constituents and interests, “taken as a whole.”
Subpart (2) enables the benefit corporation to supplement the list
of interests with additional ones.70 The official commentary does not
address subpart (2), and it stands to reason that this subpart expresses
the unremarkable proposition that the director of a benefit corporation may consider interests beyond the bare minimum list of interests
provided by the Model Legislation. This would not be an exception
that might swallow the general rule owing to the fact that, as previously discussed, the benefit corporation, regardless of the decisions it

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See supra text accompanying notes 11–15.
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301(a)(1) (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017).
Id. § 301 cmt.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 50.
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301(a)(2) (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017).
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makes, is ultimately beholden to effecting a “material positive impact
on society and the environment, taken as a whole.”71
Of greater significance is subpart (3), which clarifies that the director of a benefit corporation “need not give priority to a particular interest or factor” referenced above, unless, of course, the benefit
corporation had committed to such a prioritization in its articles of
incorporation.72 Perhaps this is intended to assuage fears that somehow shareholders of a benefit corporation would inevitably be relegated to an inferior position than to other corporate interests.
Moreover, via its wording, subpart (3) acknowledges (if not invites)
the prioritization of one particular interest or group of interests over
certain others (subject to the overarching objective of effecting a “material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a
whole”73). As such, the benefit corporation need not reject shareholder primacy; it only needs to temper it.
Part (b) of section 301 makes clear that “consideration of interests
and factors in the manner provided by subsection (a) . . . does not
constitute a violation” of directors’ traditional corporate law duties
and would be in addition to interests and factors set forth in any nonshareholder constituency provisions already part of the adopting
state’s corporate law.74 This is an important acknowledgment as it ensures that compliance with the Model Legislation will not cause a director to run afoul of his or her duties under general business
corporation law, especially if traditionally understood as requiring
shareholder wealth maximization.
Part (c) goes a step further than part (b) and exonerates directors
from personal liability for any shortcomings with respect to their obligation to consider the various interests set forth in part (a) aside from
those arising out of a conflict of interest.75 It also exonerates benefit
corporation directors from personal liability for failing “to pursue or
create general public or specific public benefit.”76 The first exoneration identified is not particularly remarkable and is reminiscent of
similar exculpatory provisions already contained in state corporate
law indemnifying directors from duty-of-care claims but not duty-ofloyalty claims.77 The second exoneration, regarding failure to pursue
or create a general public or specific public benefit, is noteworthy as it
permits directors to disregard the entire purpose of the benefit corporation with impunity. Presumably, drafters included part (c) in the
71. See supra text accompanying note 50.
72. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301(a)(3) (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017).
73. See supra text accompanying note 50.
74. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301(b) (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017).
75. Id. § 301(c).
76. Id.
77. See RONALD J. COLOMBO, THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS §§ 2:9–2:10 (2018).
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Model Legislation to help minimize the hesitancy individuals might
have to serve as director of a benefit corporation.
Part (d) critically establishes that the directors of a benefit corporation do not “have a duty to a person that is a beneficiary of the general public benefit purpose or specific public benefit purpose”78 and
thus maintains the established corporate law principle that only shareholders may ordinarily sue directors for breach of duty.79
Part (e) statutorily enshrines the business judgment rule with regard
to obligations and duties arising under the Model Legislation. The formulation is modeled after the American Law Institute’s approach to
the business judgment rule, and is a fair recitation of the rule:80
Business Judgments. – A director who makes a business judgment
in good faith fulfills the duty under this section if the director:
(1) is not interested in the subject of the business judgment;
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the extent the director reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances; and
(3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best
interests of the benefit corporation.81

6. Accountability: Standard of Conduct for Officers
The Model Legislation addresses the standard of conduct for benefit corporation officers, requiring them to take into account the interests and factors that the benefit corporation directors must take into
account, as discussed previously.82 Cognizant of the role that officers
play within the organization, the Model Legislation only applies this
standard with respect to matters over which the officer has “discretion” to act and only in circumstances where “it reasonably appears to
the officer that the matter may have a material effect on the creation
by the benefit corporation of general public benefit or a specific public
benefit.”83
Section 303 repeats the protections in place for directors of benefit
corporations as follows:
78. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301(d) (B Lab Apr. 17, 2017).
79. The official commentary to section 301(d) references the ability of nonshareholders to bring a “benefit enforcement proceeding” if the benefit corporation’s articles of incorporation so provide. Id. § 301 cmt. According to the comment, the
authority for allowing such suits is purportedly contained in section 305(b) of the
Model Legislation. Id. However, section 305(b) permits no such thing, and the concept of nonshareholder lawsuits is nowhere addressed in the Model Legislation. The
closest thing to this is permission for shareholders of a benefit corporation’s parent
company to bring a lawsuit. See id. § 305(c)(2)(ii). As such, this commentary appears
to be a scrivener’s error—an accidental holdover, perhaps, from an earlier version of
the Model Legislation.
80. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301(e) & cmt. (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017).
81. Id. § 301(e).
82. Id. § 303(a); see also supra Part II.B.5.
83. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 303(a) (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017).
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• Part (b) of section 303 makes clear that “consideration of interests and factors in the manner provided by subsection (a) . . .
does not constitute a violation” of the officer’s traditional corporate law duties.
• Part (c) of section 303 exonerates officers from personal liability
for any shortcomings with respect to their obligations to consider the various interests set forth in part (a) aside from those
arising out of a conflict of interest. It also exonerates them from
personal liability if the benefit corporation fails “to pursue or
create general public or specific public benefit.”
• Part (d) of section 304 extends the protections of the business
judgment rule, as formulated in section 303, to benefit corporate
officers.84
Part (d), addressing the business judgment rule, should not be
passed upon without some additional notice. There is no current consensus regarding whether the business judgment rule applies to corporate officers.85 As such, there is a certain boldness in this particular
provision of the Model Legislation. That was apparently not lost upon
the legislation’s drafters who, in the official commentary, remarked
that “[i]f the law of the enacting state is not clear that the business
judgment rule applies generally to actions by officers of corporations,
consideration should be given to confirm that the rule applies more
broadly than just under this chapter.”86 A less strident approach, particularly in the official comments was certainly possible, and arguably
more in keeping with legislation drafted specifically to introduce a
new form of business organization while leaving as much of pre-existing business corporation law as possible intact and untouched.
7. Accountability: Right of Action
In addition to the exoneration provisions for directors and officers
set forth previously, the Model Legislation generally precludes anyone
from bringing a claim against the corporation with respect to “failure
of [the corporation] to pursue or create general public benefit or a
specific public benefit” or “violation of an obligation, duty, or standard of conduct” under the Model Legislation.87 The one exception to
this preclusion is the “benefit enforcement proceeding.” The benefit
enforcement proceeding is defined as:
A claim, action, or proceeding for:
(1) failure of a benefit corporation to pursue or create general
public benefit or a specific public benefit purpose set forth in
its articles; or
84. Id. § 303(b)–(e).
85. See generally Gregory Scott Crespi, Should the Business Judgment Rule Apply
to Corporate Officers, and Does it Matter?, 31 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 237 (2006).
86. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 303 cmt. (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017).
87. Id. § 305(a).
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(2) violation of any obligation, duty or standard of conduct under
this [chapter].88

Section 305 expounds upon the concept of a benefit enforcement
proceeding. Part (b) of the section precludes money damages against
the corporation “for any failure . . . to pursue or create general public
benefit or a specific public benefit.”89 Interestingly, this preclusion
does not extend to the second grounds for bringing a benefit enforcement proceeding: for a violation of “an obligation, duty, or standard
of conduct” under the Model Legislation. As these two grounds certainly overlap to a degree, it is difficult to see how this line between
them will be policed when it comes to claims for monetary damages.
Part (c) of section 305 identifies those parties who have standing to
bring a benefit enforcement proceeding as: (1) the benefit corporation
itself; (2) a 2% shareholder of any class or series of stock of the corporation (or group of such shareholders); and (3) a 5% shareholder of
any class or series of stock of an entity of which the corporation is a
subsidiary (or group of such shareholders).90
There is no mention of the relief available in a benefit enforcement
proceeding, other than the limitation on monetary liability set forth in
section 305(b).
8. Accountability: The Annual Benefit Report
The Model Legislation requires the preparation of an “annual benefit report” by the benefit corporation.91 The report must contain a narrative description detailing the ways in which the corporation pursued
a general public benefit and the extent to which such benefit was created (and the same with regard to a specific public benefit, if applicable).92 The report must also identify circumstances that have hindered
its efforts in this regard.93
The corporation must assess its “overall social and environmental
performance” against a third-party standard and must explain its
“process and rationale” for selecting such standard.94 The Model Legislation defines the term “third-party standard” as independent entities with experience in assessing overall corporate social and
environmental impact against various stakeholders. This definition includes organizations such a B Lab, the legislation’s author.95 That
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. § 102.
Id. § 305(b).
Id. § 305(c).
Id. § 401(a).
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 401(a) (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 102.
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said, the benefit report itself need not be audited or certified by a
third party.96
The benefit report must set forth the “compensation paid by the
benefit corporation during the year to each director in the capacity of
a director.”97 This is duplicative for public companies,98 and is another
arguably questionable encroachment upon state corporate law with
regard to nonpublic companies.
Section 401 contains a few provisions regarding benefit directors
and benefit officers. As set forth below, these are individuals that a
benefit corporation may optionally appoint.99 If a benefit corporation
opts to appoint a benefit director or/and officer, it must disclose their
names and contact addresses.100 With regard to benefit directors, such
persons shall include a separate report to accompany the annual benefit report addressing:
(1) whether the benefit corporation acted in accordance with its
general public benefit purpose and any specific public benefit purpose in all material respects during the period covered by the
report.
(2) Whether the directors and officers complied with [their standard of conduct, as discussed previously].
(3) If the benefit director believes that the benefit corporation or
its directors or officers failed to act or comply in the manner described in paragraphs (1) and (2), a description of the ways in which
the benefit corporation or its directors or officers failed to act or
comply.101

Should a benefit director resign, be removed, or decide not to stand
for reelection, the annual benefit shall include as an exhibit “any written correspondence concerning the circumstances” relating thereto.102
Finally, section 402 covers issues concerning the availability and dissemination of the annual benefit report. The report must be distributed to each shareholder either (1) 120 days following the end of the
corporation’s fiscal year or (2) at the same time it delivers any other
annual report.103 Simultaneously, the report shall be filed with the secretary of state; such filing may omit information on director compensation and proprietary information.104 The report shall be posted on
the corporation’s website if it has one, and information regarding director compensation and proprietary matters may be omitted in the
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. § 401(c).
Id. § 401(a)(4).
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2018).
See infra text accompanying notes 107–115.
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 401(a)(3) (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017).
Id. § 302(c).
Id. § 401(b).
Id. § 402(a).
Id. § 402(d).
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posted version.105 If the corporation does not have a website, copies
shall be made available free of charge to “any person that requests a
copy” and may omit director compensation and proprietary
information.106
9. The Benefit Director and Benefit Officer
In section 302, the Model Legislation provides for the optional inclusion of a “benefit director” on the board of a benefit corporation.
This individual is to serve with the same “powers, duties, rights, and
immunities” of all other directors.107 He or she shall be subject to the
same standards and procedures for election and removal as all other
directors under state corporate law and the articles of incorporation.108 He or she shall be subject to the same qualification requirements, with one exception: the benefit director “shall be an individual
who is independent.”109 The Model Legislation provides a definition
of independence, keyed to the absence of a “material relationship”
with the benefit corporation or a subsidiary of the benefit corporation.110 A material relationship will be conclusively presumed if: (1)
the individual is or has been an employee of the benefit corporation
(or one of its subsidiaries) within the last three years, (2) an immediate family member of the individual is or has been an executive of the
benefit corporation (or one of its subsidiaries) within the last three
years, or (3) the individual (or an entity over which the individual has
control or a threshold ownership interest) owns 5% or more of the
outstanding shares of the benefit corporation (calculated to include
unexercised rights to acquire such shares).111
Section 302 absolves the benefit director from personal liability “for
an act or omission in the capacity of a benefit director unless the act
or omission constitutes self-dealing, willful misconduct, or a knowing
violation of the law.”112 This protection is automatic and is in addition
to any other provisions contained within the corporation’s articles or
bylaws eliminating or limiting the personal liability of corporate
directors.
As previously indicated, if the corporation has a benefit director,
that director must prepare a separate report to accompany the corporation’s annual benefit report.113 The corporation may also opt to designate a “benefit officer.”114 Such an officer will have whatever
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. § 402(b).
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 402(c) (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017).
Id. § 302(a)(2).
Id. § 302(b).
Id.
Id. § 102.
Id.
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 302(e) (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017).
See supra text accompanying note 101.
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 304(a) (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017).
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powers and duties are vested in him by the corporation, coupled with
an obligation to prepare the corporation’s annual benefit report.115
C. Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation Statute
Although Delaware never adopted a nonshareholder constituency
statute,116 it did pass benefit corporation legislation in 2013. Delaware’s approach to the benefit corporation differs in a number of significant ways from B Lab’s Model Legislation. The following Sections
assume familiarity with the Model Legislation discussed previously,
and as such will engage in a more abridged examination (focusing
more on critical differences).
As with the Model Legislation, Delaware’s statute merely supplements (and supersedes where divergent) its pre-existing business corporation law.117 It also follows a similar, albeit tweaked nomenclature:
a “public benefit corporation” is the entity enabled by Delaware’s legislation, a minor departure from the term “benefit corporation” employed by the Model Legislation.118 But there the similarities largely
end.
The most immediate and obvious difference between the two approaches is the size and detail of the legislative text itself. Whereas the
Model Benefit Corporation Legislation runs twenty-three pages long
(albeit with commentary included),119 the Delaware legislation for
public benefit corporations is a mere three pages long.120 This reflects
Delaware’s more modest approach, in which many of the features included in the Model Legislation are not included. Among these omissions are the concepts of benefit directors and benefit officers. Other
items, addressed at length in the Model Legislation, are treated more
succinctly and flexibly in the Delaware approach, further accounting
for the disparity in length. The most significant examples of these differences are addressed below.
1. Formation
As with the Model Legislation, a corporation may be organized as a
public benefit corporation ab initio, in which case there is no material
difference between the two approaches.121
115. Id. § 304(b).
116. See Mocsary, supra note 10, at 1359.
117. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 361 (Supp. 2018).
118. Id. Other jurisdictions have adopted more divergent names. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 607.501 (West 2016) (“Social Purpose Corporations”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 420D-3 (LexisNexis 2017) (“Sustainable Business Corporations”).
119. See generally, MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017).
The commentary consumes less than half the total lines of text.
120. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–368 (Supp. 2018).
121. Id. § 361.
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Similarly, an existing corporation may be reorganized as a public
benefit corporation upon a two-thirds vote of outstanding voting stock
or via the consequence of a merger upon the same margin of approval.122 However, Delaware grants appraisal rights to those shareholders who “neither voted in favor of such amendment or such
merger or consolidation [giving rise to public benefit corporation status] nor consented thereto in writing.”123 These rights entitle the dissenting shareholders to “an appraisal by the Court of Chancery of the
fair value of the stockholder’s shares of stock.”124 Other states, such as
Colorado,125 Florida,126 Kansas,127 and South Carolina128 have followed Delaware’s lead here, and provide for an appraisal remedy for
dissenting shareholders.
As with the Model Legislation, only a two-thirds shareholder majority is required for a public benefit corporation to shed such status
and revert to (or otherwise become) an ordinary business
corporation.129
2. Corporate Purposes and Public Benefit
As stated earlier, the heart of the benefit corporation is its abandonment of the shareholder primacy norm.130 On this count, Delaware’s law generally parallels that of the Model Legislation. As per
the Delaware Act:
A public benefit corporation is a for-profit corporation organized
under and subject to the requirements of this chapter that is intended to produce a public benefit or public benefits and to operate
in a responsible and sustainable manner. To that end, a public benefit corporation shall be managed in a manner that balances the
stockholders’ pecuniary interests, the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the public benefit or
public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation.131
122. Id. § 363(a). Delaware had originally required a 90% vote of eligible shareholders to effect this change in corporate status, reflecting, perhaps, Delaware’s instinctive protectiveness of shareholder interests. See Kennan Khatib, Comment, The
Harms of the Benefit Corporation, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 187 n.198 (2015).
123. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 363(b).
124. Id.
125. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-504(3) (2018).
126. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.504(3) (West 2016).
127. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-72a03 (Supp. 2017).
128. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-600 (Supp. 2018).
129. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 363(c) (Supp. 2018).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 64–67.
131. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a). As with the Model Legislation, one could
fairly take issue with the suggestion that traditional corporations (many if not most of
them) don’t already produce public benefits and operate in responsible, sustainable
manners.
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A difference arises, however, with respect to how the term “public
benefit” is defined. Recall how the Model Legislation defined public
benefit:
A material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as
a whole, from the business and operations of a benefit corporation
assessed taking into account the impacts of the benefit corporation
as reported against a third-party standard.132

The Model Legislation then proceeded to promulgate a suggested
list of “specific public benefits”133 that could optionally be conjoined
to the benefit corporation’s general public benefit. As the specific
public benefit definition concluded with an open-ended provision
(“conferring any other particular benefit on society or the environment”), I questioned its utility.134 Additionally, I criticized the Model
Legislation for tethering “general public benefit” to the environment.
Furthermore, I critiqued it for promoting “the environment” in three
of seven enumerated “specific public benefits.”135 Delaware opted for
a more streamlined approach, merging the concepts of “general public
benefit” and “specific public benefit” into one as follows:
“Public benefit” means a positive effect (or reduction of negative
effects) on 1 or more categories of persons, entities, communities or
interests (other than stockholders in their capacities as stockholders) including, but not limited to, effects of an artistic, charitable,
cultural, economic, educational, environmental, literary, medical,
religious, scientific or technological nature.136

The Delaware approach is arguably superior, as it eliminates the
redundancies of the Model Legislation’s provisions. It also dispenses
with the awkward calculus of achieving a “material positive impact on
society and the environment, taken as a whole,” and more directly
focuses on simply positive (or the reduction of negative) effects.137
Finally, the Model Legislation’s flexibility notwithstanding, the
broader articulation of potential categories of public benefit contained
in the Delaware statute broadcasts a certain respectfulness of entrepreneurs and their diversity, acknowledging their ability to identify
undertakings fairly characterized as providing public benefit. Delaware’s approach here has been influential, and a number of states
have opted for the same or a similar definition of public benefit over
that set forth by the Model Legislation.138
132. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102 (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017).
133. Id.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 60–63.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 50–53.
136. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(b) (Supp. 2018).
137. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102 (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017).
138. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-503 (2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.502(6)
(West 2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-72a02(b) (Supp. 2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4828-103 (Supp. 2018).
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3. Stock Legend Requirement
Another innovation contained in the Delaware legislation that has
been adopted elsewhere is the requirement that “[a]ny stock certificate issued by a public benefit corporation shall note conspicuously
that the corporation is a public benefit corporation.”139 This again underscores Delaware’s sensitivity to shareholder protection, as it serves
to minimize the risk that an unwary investor might purchase stock in a
public benefit corporation ignorant of the corporation’s status as such.
4. Standard of Conduct for Directors
Section 365 of the Delaware statute addresses the duties of directors. It commences by declaring broadly that:
The board of directors shall manage or direct the business and affairs of the public benefit corporation in a manner that balances the
pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of those
materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific
public benefit or public benefits identified in its certification of
incorporation.140

This parallels Delaware’s description of a public benefit corporation
set forth previously.141 Section 365 further operationalizes the prior
general statement about how the corporation is to be managed by
transforming the same text into a duty incumbent upon the board of
directors.
Section 365 is analogous to section 301 of the Model Legislation
discussed above which, in the wordier fashion of the Model Legislation, includes a litany of constituents and interests to be considered by
the board, ending with the open-ended allowance for “other pertinent
factors or the interests of any other group that” the board deems appropriate.142 To the extent that a substantive difference between sections 365 (Delaware) and 301 (the Model Legislation) exists, it would
appear to be found in Delaware’s tethering of directorial duties to
“those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct.”143 The
Model Legislation, contrariwise, mandates consideration of interests
beyond such limitations, including factors like the “global environment.”144 But this apparent difference could be illusory, because even
under the Model Legislation, the directors are bound to consider “the
139. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 364 (Supp. 2018). Similar provisions appear in the
benefit corporation laws of California, Colorado, Montana, Nevada, and Tennessee.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 14631 (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-505 (2018); 2015
Mont. Laws § 11, 1326, 1332; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78B.130 (LexisNexis 2018);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-105 (Supp. 2018).
140. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (Supp. 2018).
141. Id. § 362(a).
142. See supra text accompanying note 64.
143. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (Supp. 2018).
144. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301(a)(1)(v) (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017).
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effects of any action or inaction” of the corporation upon such interests,145 arguably tethering the board’s duty to the actual conduct of
the corporation.
Unlike the Model Legislation, Delaware does not explicitly renounce the prioritization of one particular constituency over the
other. Again, however, such renunciation is arguably superfluous,
given the board’s mandate to “balance” the interests of shareholders
with those of other constituencies and concerns.
As with the Model Legislation, the duties of public benefit corporation directors do not extend to purported beneficiaries of the corporation’s public-benefit mission.146 The relevant text reads as follows:
A director of a public benefit corporation shall not, by virtue of the
public benefit provisions of § 362(a) of this title, have any duty to
any person on account of any interest of such person in the public
benefit or public benefits identified in the certificate of incorporation or on account of any interest materially affected by the corporation’s conduct . . . .147

The Model Legislation explicitly affords benefit corporation directors the protection of the business judgment rule in section 301(e).148
Delaware apparently reaches the same result by declaring simply that:
[W]ith respect to a decision implicating the balance requirement in
[section 365(a), quoted above], [a director] will be deemed to satisfy
such director’s fiduciary duties to stockholders and the corporation
if such director’s decision is both informed and disinterested and
not such that no person of ordinary, sound judgment would
approve.149

Recall that the Model Legislation also exonerates directors from
personal liability with regard to the fulfillment (or not) of their particular duties as directors of a benefit corporation, absent a showing of
self-interest.150 Delaware’s statute does not contain such exoneration
as a default, but rather as an option.151 As per section 365(c) of the
Delaware statute:
The certificate of a public benefit corporation may include a provision that any disinterested failure to satisfy this section shall not, for
the purposes of § 102(b)(7) or § 145 of this title, constitute an act or
omission not in good faith, or a breach of the duty of loyalty.152

Sections 102(b)(7) and 145 of the Delaware General Corporation
Law permit the indemnification of directors for breach of duty, so
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. § 301(a)(1).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(b) (Supp. 2018).
Id.
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301(e) (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(b) (Supp. 2018).
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301(c) (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(c) (Supp. 2018).
Id.
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long as such breach does not constitute an act or omission not in good
faith or a breach of the duty of loyalty.153 Consequently, section
365(c) permits public benefit corporations to carve out from the scope
of potential liability all of a director’s duties specific to the public benefit corporation statute, provided that the director’s conduct in question was untainted by conflict of interest.
Unlike the Model Legislation, the Delaware statute does not address the duties of officers in a public benefit corporation.
Also, as previously mentioned, the Delaware statute does not address the possibility of a dedicated “benefit director” or a “benefit
officer.”154 Interestingly, this is an area where some states have
bucked both the Model Legislation (which permits the optional appointment of a benefit director or officer), and Delaware (which does
not provide for such a position): nearly a dozen states have made the
appointment of a benefit director mandatory.155
5. The Right of Action
Whereas the Model Legislation sets forth a limited right of action
referred to as a “benefit enforcement proceeding,”156 in which monetary damages cannot be sought,157 Delaware permits a regular derivate lawsuit “to enforce the requirements set forth in § 365(a)
[articulating the duties of public benefit corporation directors].”158 Although “to enforce” could be read as limited to equitable relief, the
statute does not explicitly preclude the availability of monetary relief.
Unlike an ordinary shareholder derivative lawsuit, however, a derivative lawsuit159 to enforce director duties particular to the public benefit corporation may only be brought by a shareholder holding “at least
two percent of the corporation’s outstanding shares or, in the case of a
corporation with shares listed on a national securities exchange, the
lesser of such percentage of shares of at least $2,000,000 in market
value.”160
Some states, such as Minnesota, explicitly permit courts in a benefit
enforcement action to order the termination of a company’s benefit
corporation status.161 Whether such equitable relief is available under
153. Id. § 102(b)(7); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2011).
154. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(12) (2011).
155. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420D-7 (LexisNexis 2017); IDAHO CODE
§ 30-2008 (2018); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/4.05 (West Supp. 2019); 15 PA. STAT.
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3322 (West Supp. 2019); 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.3-8 (2018);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-410 (Supp. 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10b-302(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10(a) (2016). See also D.C. CODE
§ 29-1303.02(a) (2013).
156. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 305 (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017).
157. Id. § 305(b).
158. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 367 (Supp. 2018).
159. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2011).
160. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 367 (Supp. 2018).
161. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.202 (West Supp. 2019).
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the legislation of Delaware or jurisdictions that adhere more closely to
the Model Legislation has not yet been litigated.
6. Disclosure
In lieu of an annual benefit report, as provided for by the Model
Legislation, Delaware requires its public benefit corporations to issue
a statement regarding its public benefit activities to shareholders “no
less than biennially.”162 This statement shall address “the corporation’s promotion of the public benefit or public benefits identified in
the certificate of incorporation and of the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct.”163 The statement shall
specifically include:
(i) The objectives the board of directors has established to promote
such public benefit or public benefits and interests;
(ii) The standards the board of directors has adopted to measure
the corporation’s progress in promoting such public benefit or public benefits and interests;
(iii) Objective factual information based on those standards regarding the corporation’s success in meeting the objectives for promoting such public benefit or public benefits and interests; and
(iv) An assessment of the corporation’s success in meeting the
objectives and promoting such public benefit or public benefits and
interests.164

Lacking B Lab’s financial incentive to require a third-party standard or assessment of the aforementioned biennial statement, Delaware does not impose this obligation upon its public benefit
corporations. Delaware does, however, permit a public benefit corporation to amend its certificate of incorporation or bylaws to require
the use of a third-party standard in its period statements.165 It may
also adopt an amendment to require the statement to be made more
frequently than biennially and to make it available to the public.166
III. HOPES

AND

FEARS REGARDING

THE

BENEFIT CORPORATION

When Maryland enacted the first benefit corporation statute in
2010, it did so with the hope of reaping certain rewards. As its sponsoring state senator proclaimed, “This is a great moment in the evolution of commercial life in Maryland and America,” allowing
“companies a way to do good and do well at the same time.”167 In162. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b) (Supp. 2018).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. § 366(c).
166. Id.
167. Michael R. Deskins, Benefit Corporation Legislation, Version 1.0-A Breakthrough in Stakeholder Rights?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1047, 1049 (2011) (quoting Sen. Jamie Raskin).
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deed, the benefit corporation was heralded as a way to achieve what
many perceive to be the Holy Grail of corporate governance: “triple
bottom line” results, pursuant to which corporate activity generates
positive economic, social, and environmental outcomes.168 This Section will summarize and assess those claims, along with the claims of
those skeptics who argued against the promulgation of benefit corporation statutes.
A. Anticipated Advantages of the Benefit Corporation
As typified by the language quoted above, the advantages of the
benefit corporation have largely been expressed in platitudes.169 However, more specifically articulated benefits arising from this new business form can and have been propounded.
1. Liberation from the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm
The shareholder wealth maximization norm is arguably the bedrock
feature of modern Anglo-American corporate law.170 Pursuant to this
norm, corporate officers and directors prioritize the maximization of
shareholder value in their oversight and operation of the corporation.171 Some scholars claim that corporate directors and officers are
duty-bound to comply with this norm,172 while others deny that the
norm is compelled by law.173 Regardless, even the norm’s detractors
acknowledge that, whether legally binding or not, the shareholder
wealth maximization norm has a tremendous hold upon corporate directors and officers, exerting significant pressure on how they view
and fulfill their roles.174 By explicitly downgrading shareholder wealth
maximization as merely one of the multiple corporate objectives, benefit corporation statutes serve to unshackle the directors and officers
of benefit corporations from this norm.175 Moreover, some herald the
benefit corporation as a “game changer,” potentially kicking off a
competition that nudges all companies toward more socially-responsible behavior.176
The degree to which directors of a benefit corporation discount the
pressure to maximize shareholder profits has not been subjected to
168. Id. at 1049.
169. See supra text accompanying note 167.
170. See Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate about Shareholder Primacy,
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 535 (2006).
171. See id.
172. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 678 (1986).
173. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, Corporate Law Professors as Gatekeepers, 6 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 447, 450–51 (2009).
174. See id.
175. See Resor, supra note 19, at 106.
176. See Regina Robson, A New Look Benefit Corporations: Game Theory and
Game Changer, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 501, 504–05, 541, 544–52 (2015).
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empirical analysis.177 Thus, there is no data upon which to draw a conclusion regarding this hypothetical feature of the benefit corporation.
It stands to reason that the board of a benefit corporation would feel
less constrained to prioritize the financial interests of its shareholders
as compared to the board of a typical, non-benefit corporation. However, it is far from certain that such a difference exists when a benefit
corporation’s board is compared to that of a non-benefit corporation
that had already embraced a robust form of corporate social responsibility. Would, for example, a benefit corporation’s board act any differently concerning the norm of shareholder wealth maximization
than the board of a traditional business corporation that had already
opted for B Lab certification?178 In the absence of evidence, we can
only speculate, but a significant difference here would be doubtful.
Businesses that wished to de-prioritize the pursuit of private profits in
favor of some other public-regarding goal or interest have already had
the tools to do so at their disposal for quite some time.
2. Corporate Social Responsibility Accountability
Rare today is the public corporation that fails to espouse the values
of corporate social responsibility (“CSR”).179 Also rare, however, are
sustained efforts to ensure that corporate decisions and activity match
corporate rhetoric in this regard.180 Benefit corporation legislation
typically proffers a means by which a benefit corporation’s attestations of responsible behavior can be readily assessed: via third-party
verification. With regard to this novelty, some empirical data does
exist.181
Although benefit corporations must issue a report to shareholders
regularly, and under the Model Legislation and in most jurisdictions,
to make such report publicly available, this requirement falls short of
its purpose according to many commentators. First, the ability of benefit corporations to select a third-party standard of their choice seriously undermines the utility of the report.182 Second, the historical
experience of arguably analogous reporting, such as that provided by
Institutional Shareholder Services, suggests the limited effectiveness
177. One case study of one particular benefit corporation has been carried out. See
Nancy B. Kurland, Accountability and the Public Benefit Corporation, 60 BUS. HORIZONS 519 (2017). This study concluded that transition from a traditional corporation
to benefit corporation status “enables a company to hold itself accountable to its
stated public good.” Id. at 527.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 16–17.
179. See Gerlinde Berger-Walliser & Inara Scott, Redefining Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Globalization and Regulatory Hardening, 55 AM. BUS. L.J.
167, 168–69 (2018).
180. See Resor, supra note 19, at 99–100.
181. See id. at 101–02.
182. Tammi S. Etheridge, Lessons from Institutional Shareholder Services: Governing Benefit Corporations’ Third-Party Standard, 4 MICH. BUS. & ENTREP. L. REV.
239, 250 (2015).
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of this approach generally.183 Finally, the reporting requirement is left
without a clear enforcement mechanism. Perhaps unsurprisingly, compliance with the reporting requirements, based upon early results, has
been deemed “abysmal.”184
Thus, it appears as though this particular feature of the benefit corporation has not been impactful. Further, nothing prevents non-benefit corporations from issuing similar reports, subject to the same illdefined parameters contained in most benefit corporation statutes.185
Again, the question must be asked: What does benefit corporation law
enable that is not already enabled under traditional corporate law?
3. Marketplace Signaling and Internal Norm Reinforcement
Related to the concept of accountability is that of marketplace signaling and the reinforcement of internal corporate norms. An argument can be made that benefit corporation statutes enable businesses
to more credibly broadcast a commitment to corporate social responsibility than their traditional business corporation counterparts.186
This should make it easier for those businesses that are more authentically dedicated to corporate social responsibility to more effectively
compete for CSR-minded investors, customers, and employees.187 It
should also serve to further instill its particular corporate culture in
the minds of its internal constituents. The little empirical evidence
available seems to support this eminently reasonable hypothesis.188
Although the typical corporation may arguably already operate in
as socially-responsible a manner as any benefit corporation, incorporation (or reincorporation) as a benefit corporation may enable the
entity to better reap recognition of its efforts. Analogous examples of
this phenomenon abound. It is, for example, unlawful for public universities to discriminate against student applicants on the basis of certain prohibited characteristics. Yet most such universities nevertheless
trumpet their nondiscriminatory admissions policies. In short, with
few exceptions, persons and entities that behave well generally desire
to have this fact well-known and will embrace any reasonable oppor183. Id. at 259.
184. J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA. L. REV.
26, 26 (2015).
185. See, e.g., Starbuck’s Global Social Impact 2017 Performance Report, STARBUCKS, https://globalassets.starbucks.com/assets/8c1f8c07efde407e9d48bfaf518c0b45
.pdf (last visited June 8, 2019) [https://perma.cc/H46V-RUUA].
186. See Michael Vargas, The Next Stage of Social Entrepreneurship: Benefit Corporations and the Companies Using This Innovative Corporate Form, AM. BAR ASS’N
(Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/
2016/07/01_vargas/ [https://perma.cc/M64B-EF2J].
187. See id.; see also Joseph W. Yockey, Using Form to Counter Corruption: The
Promise of the Benefit Corporation, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 623, 634–44 (2015).
188. See Ke Cao et al., Positively Deviant: Identity Work Through B Corporation
Certification, 33 J. BUS. VENTURING 130 (2018); Kurland, supra note 177.
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tunity to further disseminate this fact.189 Benefit corporation status
affords businesses such an opportunity.
Moreover, benefit corporation status apparently can serve to reinforce a socially-responsible corporate culture.190 It can help a company shape its identity,191 and the very process of reorganizing as a
benefit corporation can be a transformative experience. Reorganization “requires both top-down and bottom-up driven efforts that lead
to clearly articulated and measurable goals that are communicated so
clients and employees understand how the changes affect their everyday work.”192 In sum, the deliberate choice to organize a particular
business as a benefit corporation can affect the corporation on a normative, cultural level that goes beyond simply the imposition of positive law upon the organization. Again, there are analogous examples
of this phenomenon, such as that of a “covenant marriage.”193 Proponents of covenant marriage hope not merely to make divorces more
difficult, but rather to make the institution of marriage itself
stronger.194
4. Relegitimization of Capitalism
Capitalism has long had its detractors,195 but following the collapse
of the Soviet Union and in the waning years of the twentieth century,
it appeared to lack any serious challengers.196 But in the early years of
the twenty-first century, fueled by rising income inequality, economic
crises, and scandals, capitalism’s critics have vociferously reemerged.197 Although there still exists no serious challenger to capital189. The most vivid exception that comes to mind is that contained in Matthew
6:1–4 (“Take heed that you do not your justice before men, to be seen by them: otherwise you shall not have a reward of your Father who is in heaven. Therefore when
thou dost an almsdeed, sound not a trumpet before thee, as the hypocrites do in the
synagogues and in the streets, that they may be honoured by men. Amen I say to you,
they have received their reward. But when thou dost alms, let not thy left hand know
what thy right hand doth. That thy alms may be in secret, and thy Father who seeth in
secret will repay thee.”) Matthew 6:1–4 (Douay-Rheims).
190. See Cao et al., supra note 188; Kurland, supra note 177.
191. See Cao et al., supra note 188.
192. See Kurland, supra note 177, at 527.
193. A “covenant marriage” is one in which the spouses agree to bind themselves
to particular obligations aimed at strengthening the marital bond and reducing the
potential for divorce. See generally Katherine Shaw Spaht, Why Covenant Marriage?
A Change in Culture for the Sake of the Children, 46 LA. B.J. 116, 118 (1998).
194. See id.
195. See, e.g., KARL MARX, DAS KAPITAL (1867).
196. Cf. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (2d ed.
2006).
197. See Capitalism and its Critics: A Modern Marx, ECONOMIST (May 3, 2014),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2014/05/03/a-modern-marx [https://perma.cc/
YY9A-WVH9] (reviewing THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014)); Rafael Behr, Even at Davos, Capitalism’s Critics Are Now Centre Stage,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2018, 1:00), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/
jan/23/davos-capitalism-corbynites [https://perma.cc/J2LA-V3CQ].
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ism,198 some have opined that free-market economics is undergoing a
“crisis of legitimacy.”199 To them, the benefit corporation can potentially address this crisis, and relegitimize capitalism.200 Because benefit
corporations “have the freedom to serve their stakeholders more
fully, comprehensively and honestly,” they are better situated to “gain
moral legitimacy, gratify their shareholders by discharging their moral
obligations to society, and thus build faith in the capitalist system.”201
It is extraordinarily difficult to assess this particular claim. From
populists in Washington, D.C.202 to socialists in New York,203 it does
not appear as though the advent of the benefit corporation has somehow quelled the discontent. Time will tell whether the benefit corporation represents a harbinger of some more profound change in the
economic landscape of America, an irrelevant development that will
merely be referred to in footnotes in decades to come, or, perhaps,
just the right prescription for what ails America’s twenty-first century
economic system.
B. Anticipated Disadvantages of the Benefit Corporation
From its inception, benefit corporations have raised a number of
concerns, largely conceptual in nature.204 The most salient are summarized and analyzed below.
1. Superfluous
As a threshold matter, many critics complain that benefit corporation legislation solves a problem that does not exist. Under existing
corporate law, corporate management already has sufficient latitude
to pursue objectives beyond shareholder wealth maximization, strictly
198. This calls to mind Winston Churchill’s famous quote about democracy, which
others have reformulated as “capitalism is the worst economic system, except for all
the others.” See, e.g., Matt Barnes, Capitalism: The Worst Economic System, Except
for All the Others, PITT NEWS (Aug. 26, 2014), https://pittnews.com/article/5424/opinions/capitalism-the-worst-economic-system-except-for-all-the-others/ [https://perma
.cc/5JEJ-U65Q].
199. Lydia Segal, Benefit Corporations: A Step Towards Reversing Capitalism’s Crisis of Legitimacy?, 24 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 97, 99–100 (2017).
200. See id.
201. Id. at 117.
202. See Michael Lind, Donald Trump, the Perfect Populist, POLITICO MAG. (Mar.
9, 2016), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/03/donald-trump-the-perfectpopulist-213697 [https://perma.cc/FPA6-Q6TM].
203. See David Remnick, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s Historic Win and the Future
of the Democratic Party, NEW YORKER (July 16, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2018/07/23/alexandria-ocasio-cortezs-historic-win-and-the-future-of-thedemocratic-party [https://perma.cc/87VQ-WQ6J].
204. For a particularly helpful summary, see Rae André, Benefit Corporations at a
Crossroads: As Lawyers Weigh In, Companies Weigh Their Options, 58 BUS. HORIZONS 243–52 (2015).
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defined.205 This lack of purpose serves to magnify all the other
problems and costs attendant with the legislation.
Nevertheless, some early anecdotal evidence suggests that pre-existing legal flexibility notwithstanding, assumption of benefit corporation status can indeed have an organizational effect.206 Thus, even if
corporate management is already empowered to effectively balance
other interests alongside those of shareholders, and even if certain
corporations can already credibly claim to be socially responsible,
benefit corporation status appears to nevertheless embolden boards to
exercise their discretion and to deepen an organization’s sense of
purpose.207
2. Counter-productive
To the extent that traditional corporate law already empowers officers and directors to take into account interests and concerns beyond
that of shareholder wealth maximization simpliciter, benefit corporation statutes might not be harmlessly superfluous. Rather, they may
be downright counter-productive to their advocates’ goals. The promulgation of such statutes, especially with the fanfare usually accompanying such events,208 could very well be interpreted as a sign of
their necessity and, moreover, the shortcomings of traditional corporate law with regard to nonshareholder constituencies. In other words,
the existence and promotion of benefit corporation statutes arguably
reinforces the false narrative that the traditional business corporations
must be managed solely for the benefit of its shareholders.209 This, in
turn, could retard more socially-responsible behavior on the part of
the vast majority of (traditional) business corporations.210
3. Managerial Discretion
One of the core challenges of modern corporate law has been how
best to tackle the agency problem of directors and officers entrusted
to manage property that is not their own. The benefit corporation
makes this challenge significantly more difficult. On one end of the
spectrum, the “two masters” dilemma presents itself, whereby even a
director acting with the best of good faith may find his balancing obligations unworkable.211 On the other end of the spectrum, directors
acting in bad faith should find it even easier to avoid liability given the
205. See Yockey, supra note 54, at 18.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 190–92.
207. Or, perhaps better put, exercise this power more aggressively and intentionally; the boards of business corporations have long needed to balance a variety of
interests as part and parcel of their obligation to best serve corporate shareholders.
208. See supra text accompanying note 167.
209. See David G. Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy: Is the Public Benefit Corporation Trivial?, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 461, 463 (2017).
210. See id. at 461.
211. See Yockey, supra note 54, at 24–25.
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interplay of the business judgment rule and the broader array of interests they must (and may) consider.212 And in the middle is the expanded set of interests with which a director may find himself or
herself conflicted.213
Then there is simply the question of accountability regarding the
simple craft of corporate leadership and the measurement of corporate success.214 How is “success” objectively defined and evaluated
within the context of a corporation? Is there not a fundamental conflict of interest built into the Model Legislation in that, for the most
part, the board itself defines what constitutes success—and selects the
metrics by which to measure it? How are investors to recognize
whether a benefit corporation’s profits are lower because of its altruistic undertakings or simply because of poor management? Perhaps
these questions can ultimately be answered, but with great difficulty.
In any event, at this early date, not enough data has been collected to
enable an assessment.
Finally, even the most conscientious directors are arguably illequipped to discharge their duties within the benefit corporation
structure. This is because neither the existing legislation nor the courts
have helped clarify how directors are “to make decisions based on the
divided loyalties of shareholders and stakeholders.”215
4. Benefit Enforcement
At its core, the benefit corporation exists to pursue public benefits
above and beyond those ordinarily produced by a successfully-managed corporation. But none of the currently promulgated benefit corporation statutes grant standing to public beneficiaries to challenge a
benefit corporation’s failures in this regard. This is a severe shortcoming, as Chief Justice Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court forcefully
pointed out.216 Although shareholders have the right to bring benefit
enforcement proceedings, there is little incentive for them to do so.
Unsurprisingly, no shareholder to date has brought such a case against
a benefit corporation.

212. See Bainbridge, supra note 12.
213. Gil Lan, Benefit Corporations: A Persisting and Heightened Conflict for Directors, 21 J. L. BUS. & ETHICS 113, 115 (2015).
214. See Yockey, supra note 54, at 23–24.
215. See Roxanne Thorelli, Note, Providing Clarity for Standard of Conduct for
Directors Within Benefit Corporations: Requiring Priority of a Specific Public Benefit,
101 MINN. L. REV. 1749, 1751 (2017).
216. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware
General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 790–93 (2015).
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5. Takeover Duties
Directors are subject to different duties and standards of conduct
during a potential merger or acquisition.217 Chief among these is an
undeniable obligation to maximize shareholder (and only shareholder) value once a company’s acquisition or change in control becomes inevitable.218 How these duties and standards apply to a benefit
corporation under threat of hostile acquisition, or within the context
of a friendly merger, has yet to be seen.219
6. Access to Capital and Additional Costs
Some have suggested that benefit corporations will compete poorly
in the capital markets, given the lower shareholder returns they might
be expected to generate.220 Whether this will be so, or whether the
benefit corporation will enjoy the support of niche investors, remains
to be seen. An impressive study published in the Harvard Business
Law Review detected “a small and statistically insignificant response”
by institutional investors to the passage of shareholder constituency
statutes.221 The study’s authors concluded that institutional investors
“tolerated expanded director duties” and are “evidence against fiduciary concerns impeding [alternative purpose] firms’ [(such as benefit
corporations)] access to public capital.”222 The authors were quick to
correctly add, however, that “the insignificant reaction to constituency
statutes does not guarantee a similar attitude toward alternative purpose firms.”223 For whereas constituency statutes were permissive in
nature, benefit corporation statutes are obligatory.224
Others project increased transaction costs afflicting the benefit corporation, a supposition difficult to dismiss.225 Again, the empirical
question of whether the upside of benefit corporation status is strong
enough to shoulder this particular drawback has yet to be answered.
217. See generally RONALD J. COLOMBO, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DI(2018).
218. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986).
219. But see Kristin A. Neubauer, Benefit Corporations: Providing a New Shield for
Corporations with Ideals Beyond Profits, 11 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 109 (2016) (touting
the enhanced ability of benefit corporations to resist hostile acquisitions by companies
that would undermine their public-benefit mission).
220. See Kent Greenfield, A Skeptic’s View of Benefit Corporations, 1 EMORY
CORP. GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 19 (2014).
221. Christopher Geczy et al., Institutional Investing When Shareholders are Not
Supreme, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 73, 129 (2015).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See id.
225. See André, supra note 204.
RECTORS
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7. “Profit as the Preferred Medium for Effecting Social
and Environmental Change”226
Finally, it must be kept in mind that wealth, and oftentimes great
wealth, serves as the source of generous, sometimes transformative
donations and charitable undertakings.227 To the extent that the benefit corporation sacrifices wealth, its own and that of its investors, to
pursue some public benefit concomitantly with its operations as a business, it may be undermining its very desideratum. Again, perhaps
time will supply the data necessary to help verify or reject this potential repercussion.
IV. CONCLUSION: WHITHER

THE

BENEFIT CORPORATION?

American corporate law has long taken the form of enabling legislation. As such, corporations in the United States have largely been free
to organize themselves and conduct their affairs as best they and their
various constituencies (primarily the shareholders) saw fit. Of course,
certain aspects of corporate law are indeed not merely default rules,
but features imposed by law upon all corporations, most prominently
directors’ duties of loyalty and care.228 But practically, in the absence
of bad faith or unreasonable behavior, directors typically enjoy tremendous latitude. It is rare that a board cannot successfully justify a
decision as rational and in the benefit of the shareholders. Consequently, directors are rarely found to have acted outside of their fiduciary duties. This holds true with respect to decisions regarding
corporate social responsibility as well.
Further, few corporations are immune to the pressures of public
opinion. As such, the same sentiments that have led to the promulgation of benefit corporation statutes across the nation have long pushed
corporations to embrace some measure of social responsibility. Uncommon is the corporation that neglects to “talk the talk” of corporate social responsibility. And given the power of social media, many
corporations who flagrantly refuse to “walk the walk” of corporate
social responsibility quickly incur the public’s umbrage.229
Not surprisingly, therefore, the initial impact of the benefit corporation appears muted. Indeed, one would be justified in observing that
226. Khatib, supra note 122, at 184.
227. See generally Shruti Rana, Philanthropic Innovation and Creative Capitalism:
A Historical and Comparative Perspective on Social Entrepreneurship and Corporate
Social Responsibility, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1121 (2013).
228. See William M. Lafferty et al., A Brief Introduction to the Fiduciary Duties of
Directors Under Delaware Law, 116 PA. ST. L. REV. 837, 841 (2012).
229. See, e.g., Annie Gasparro & Tawnell D. Hobbs, Starbucks Faces Backlash Over
Arrest of Black Men, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 15, 2018, 2:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/starbucks-faces-protest-over-arrest-of-black-men-1523813258 [https://perma
.cc/S7M4-ES24].
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the advent of benefit corporation legislation is more an effect of the
corporate social responsibility movement than a contributor thereto.
Regardless, why would a company elect benefit corporation status?
Given the significant risks involved in assuming this status (primarily
including increased costs, monitoring concerns, and potential difficulty
accessing investor capital) and the marginal tangible upsides, such an
election would seem to be a poor one.
But that overlooks the potentially significant intangible benefits
that benefit corporation status might bring: signaling effects with regard to the outside world and normative effects internally. It would
seem, therefore, that those organizations already committed to a particular socially-responsible identity might opt for incorporation (or
reincorporation) as benefit corporations not because of anything contained in the text of the benefit corporation statutes, but rather because of the potential reputational and motivational value that
association with this form of business organization might bestow.
As more firms opt for benefit corporation status, will pressure build
on other companies to follow suit? Fruition of this hope seems unlikely. Such a domino effect was not discernable with regard to the
analogous development of the “B Corp,” and that designation carries
far fewer risks. Further, the market for the capital of truly dedicated,
socially-responsible investors remains a niche market, as the far
greater portion of the capital markets remains fixated upon investor
return.230 Consequently, there is unlikely to be pressure for companies
to assume benefit corporation status from one of the most influential
sources of all: the capital markets.
Benefit corporation law could serve as a form of consumer/investor
protection legislation, protecting socially-conscious investors from being duped into supporting companies whose embrace of corporate social responsibility is merely illusory. This would be a valuable function
in light of the growing number of socially-responsible investors, and
with it increase competition for their dollars. Query whether, however, existing securities laws regarding disclosure and fraud already
serve this same purpose—at least with regard to the more egregious
lack of corporate candor.
Sadly, with regard to this promise of improved accountability, benefit corporation law appears to have failed most demonstrably. Scant
disclosures, lack of uniform standards, and lack of standing to bring a
benefit enforcement proceeding have combined to dash these hopes.
An unanticipated service of benefit corporation laws might be to
assist in the resolution of the controversy over corporate constitutional rights, more specifically with regard to the assertion of speech,
230. See Sarah Ponczek & Rachel Evans, One Man’s Quest to Make Socially Responsible Investing More Responsible, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 28, 2018, 11:14 AM), https:/
/www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-28/an-etf-iconoclast-s-quest-to-put-the-sback-into-esg-investing [https://perma.cc/2QW8-WCHU].
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associational, and religious liberties. For two leading objections to the
corporate assertion of such rights is: (1) the shareholder wealth maximization norm (which, the argument goes, belies any authentic or justifiable political or religious concerns on the part of the corporation),
and (2) the purported unfairness of the board’s commandeering of
corporate resources in furtherance of political or religious ends not
shared by all (or possibly not even by any) of the corporation’s constituencies.231 Benefit corporation status largely dispenses with each
of these objections. First, the shareholder wealth maximization norm
is explicitly jettisoned, replaced by a legal mandate to balance shareholder interests with those of other constituencies and purposes. This
makes it difficult to credibly gainsay the authenticity of the corporation’s attestation of particular political or religious principles. Second,
the clarion signaling effect that benefit corporation status has upon
corporate outsiders and insiders makes untenable the argument that
there is any unfairness when the corporation’s board takes action, be
it of a political or religious nature, that is in furtherance of or otherwise consistent with the corporation’s declared values and objectives.
Thus, benefit corporation status can play a leading role in deciding
how best to navigate the thicket of corporate constitutional rights. As
I have expanded upon elsewhere,232 a business’s status as a benefit
corporation can serve as a key factor in assessing the strength of its
free speech, associational, or religious liberty assertions. Given how
heated and controversial the debate over corporate constitutional
rights has been, this contribution alone would make the benefit corporation movement well worth the effort.

231. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not
Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995, 1034–52 (1998).
232. See RONALD J. COLOMBO, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE BUSINESS CORPORATION (2014).
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i

Arkansas’s Benefit legislation includes a requirement that the benefit corporation prepare
an annual franchise tax report along with the benefit report. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-36-401
(2013).
ii
Section 14603 of the California benefit corporation statute states:
(a) A corporation may become a benefit corporation under this part by
amending the corporation’s articles so that the articles contain a
statement that the corporation is a benefit corporation. The amendment
shall not be effective unless it is adopted by at least the minimum status
vote. If the amendment is adopted, a shareholder of the corporation may,
by complying with Chapter 13 (commencing with Section 1300) of
Division 1, require the corporation to purchase at their fair market value
the shares owned by the shareholder which are dissenting shares as
defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1300 in accordance with the
procedures in that chapter, as if the adoption of the amendment were a
reorganization to which that chapter applies.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 14603 (West 2012).
The definition does not include a failure to “create” a public benefit, and it adds another
basis for suit—the failure to deliver or post the annual benefit report as required. CAL. CORP.
CODE § 14630 (West 2012).
iv
Connecticut’s minimum status vote is substantially similar to the Model Legislation’s.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-1354 (2014).
v
Florida’s minimum status vote is substantially similar to the Model Legislation’s. FLA.
STAT. § 607.602(7) (2016).
vi
Unlike the Model Legislation, directors are only required to consider the effects of the
sustainable business corporation’s actions upon its shareholders and the accomplishment of
general and specific public benefits. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420D-6 (2017).
vii
The statute does not limit actions to benefit enforcement proceedings nor does it limit
monetary damages against the sustainable business corporation, but rather it states that
shareholders or directors:
iii

[S]hall have the right to bring direct or derivative claims to enforce
corporate purposes and the standards for directors as set forth in section
414-221(a) and shall have the right to bring direct or derivative claims to
enforce the general or specific public benefit purposes of the sustainable
business corporation and the standard of conduct for directors pursuant
to section 420D-6(a)(1).
Id. § 420D-10.
viii
Hawaii also uniquely requires that the benefit report include:
[a] statement that, as a private corporation under the direction of its
board and accountable to its shareholders and the articles and bylaws of
the sustainable business corporation, including those governing the
general or specific public benefit purpose and the activities of the
sustainable business corporation, the sustainable business corporation
and its activities are subject to the oversight of the board of the
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sustainable business corporation and are not subject to the direct
oversight, regulation, or endorsement of any governmental body.
Id. § 420D-11(a)(8).
ix
The statute does not require that the general public benefit be “taken as a whole,” and it is
measured “through activities that promote a combination of specific public benefits.” MD.
CODE ANN., CORPS & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01(b) (West 2010).
x
The standard need not be “recognized” and there are no provisions addressing
comprehensiveness, credibility, or the source of financial support for the entity that
developed/controls the standard. Also, it states that the developing entity must be
“independent of” the benefit corporation, rather than “not controlled by” it. Id. § 5-6C-01(e).
xi
The statute does contain the concept of a benefit enforcement proceeding. MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, § 14 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 34, except Ch. 37 of the 2019 1st
Ann. Sess.) (“Except in a benefit enforcement proceeding, no person shall bring an action or
assert a claim against a benefit corporation or its directors or officers . . . .”).
xii
The New York statute omits language in Model Legislation definition (1)(i) regarding
limitations on voting rights of any class or series and requires 3/4 vote (instead of 2/3
required in the Model Legislation). N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1702(2) (McKinney, Westlaw
through L.2019, ch. 186).
xiii
The benefit enforcement proceeding concept is not included in this particular statute. An
amendment was made to § 720(a)(1)(C) of the N.Y. Business Corporation Law to address
actionable conduct. It allows a cause of action for (i) failure to pursue general or specific
benefit, (ii) failure to deliver or post an annual report, or (iii) other neglect or failure of
duties or standard of conduct of directors and officers. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 720
(McKinney, Westlaw through L.2019, ch. 186).
xiv

(2) A person may commence a direct or derivative proceeding, as
appropriate, to compel a benefit company to provide a general public
benefit or a specific public benefit or to require a governor, member,
officer or manager to act in accordance with a duty or a standard of
conduct set forth in the benefit company’s articles of incorporation or
articles of organization, or prescribed under ORS 60.750 to 60.770, only
if the person is:
(a) The benefit company;
(b) A governor;
(c) A shareholder or member; or
(d) Another person identified in the benefit company’s bylaws, articles
of incorporation or articles of organization as having a right to
commence a proceeding under this section.
(3) A benefit company is not liable for money damages as a
consequence of failing to provide a general public benefit or a specific
public benefit.
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.766 (West, Westlaw through laws enacted in 2018 Reg. Sess. &
2018 Special Sess. of 79th Legis. Assembly).
xv

(2) A person may commence a direct or derivative proceeding, as
appropriate, to compel a benefit company to provide a general public
benefit or a specific public benefit or to require a governor, member,
officer or manager to act in accordance with a duty or a standard of
conduct set forth in the benefit company’s articles of incorporation or
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articles of organization, or prescribed under ORS 60.750 to 60.770, only
if the person is:
(a) The benefit company;
(b) A governor;
(c) A shareholder or member; or
(d) Another person identified in the benefit company’s bylaws, articles
of incorporation or articles of organization as having a right to
commence a proceeding under this section.
(3) A benefit company is not liable for money damages as a
consequence of failing to provide a general public benefit or a specific
public benefit.
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.766 (West, Westlaw through laws enacted in 2018 Reg. Sess. &
2018 Special Sess. of 79th Legis. Assembly).
xvi
“In addition to any other rights granted by law, a shareholder is entitled to dissent from
and obtain payment of the fair value of his shares in the event of the consummation of a
designation of a corporation as a benefit corporation pursuant to Section 33-38-210(A).”
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-600 (Westlaw, through 2019 Act. No. 90).
xvii

Any shareholder of a domestic for-profit corporation that holds shares of
stock of the domestic for-profit corporation immediately prior to the
effective time of the following actions shall be entitled to dissent and
obtain payment for the shareholder's shares under chapter 23 of this title;
provided that such shareholder has neither voted in favor of the
amendment or the merger or plan of share exchange nor consented to in
writing pursuant to § 48-17-104[.]
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-104(b) (LEXIS, LexisNexis through 2019 Reg. Session).
xviii

In discharging the duties of the position of director of a for-profit benefit
corporation, a director shall consider the effects of any contemplated,
proposed, or actual transaction or other conduct on the interests of those
materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, including the pecuniary
interests of shareholders, and the public benefit or public benefits
identified in its charter and shall not give regular, presumptive, or
permanent priority to the interests of any individual constituency or
limited group of constituencies materially affected by the corporation’s
conduct, including the pecuniary interests of shareholders.
Id. § 48-28-106(a).
Vermont’s right of action does not contain a provision like Model Legislation § 305(a)–
(b) stating that a benefit corporation is not liable for monetary damages for failure to create
or pursue general or specific public benefit. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.13(a)–(c)
(2018). Vermont’s provision (c)(1) does not include “or create” after “pursue,” and
provision (c)(2) does not include “obligation.” Id. § 21.13(c)(1)–(2).
xx
Vermont’s right of action provision does not include Model Legislation’s § 305(c)(1)
permitting an action to be brought directly by the benefit corporation. See id. § 21.13(a)–(c).
This provision does not cross-reference derivative suit provisions, rather provision (b)(1)
states a suit may be brought by “a shareholder that would otherwise be entitled to commence
or maintain a proceeding in the right of the benefit corporation on any basis,” and provision
xix
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(b)(3) states an action may be brought by 10% beneficial or record owners (rather than 5%
in the Model Legislation). Id. § 21.13(b)(1), (3); MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION §
306(c)(2)(ii).
xxi
The first sentence adds requirement that the benefit corporation deliver an annual report
to each shareholder and the report must be “in a format approved by the directors,” but the
narrative description does not require description of process and rationale for selecting or
changing the third-party standard. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14(a)(1)(A)–(D). Other
requirements vary as follows: the report must describe (i) a statement of the specific
goals/outcomes identified to meet the purpose(s), (ii) a description of the actions taken to
meet the goals/outcomes, (iii) circumstances that hindered attainment of the goals/outcomes,
and (iv) specific actions the benefit corporation can take to improve performance or attain its
goals/outcomes. Id. The statute does not include Model Legislation § 401(a)(2)(ii)(B)
regarding explanation of change of third-party standard from immediately prior report and
does not include Model Legislation § 401(a)(6) regarding statement of any connection
between standards provider and benefit corporation. See id. Subsection (3) requires a
statement of goals/outcomes for the next benefit report and that such list be approved by the
shareholders of the benefit corporation, and does not include Model Legislation § 401(a)(7)
regarding the statement of connection between the organization that established the thirdparty standard and the benefit corporation. Id. § (a)(3).
xxii
A definition not included. However, several provisions cross-reference to § 13.1-707 for
the required vote (2/3 majority of each voting group, unless otherwise provided in articles or
conditioned otherwise by the board of directors). See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-785 (2011).

